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The purpose of this thesis is to study software metrics from the program
manager's perspective. To accomplish this I focus on the application of metrics in the
software development effort for the M2A3 variant of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
Specifically, I analyze the effectiveness of software metrics in this program and the
reasons for their effectiveness. This analysis also illustrates lessons learned during this
software development with respect to metrics. The objective of this thesis is to discuss
and generalize from these lessons learned, thereby informing and benefiting future
program managers of software-intensive systems.
B. BACKGROUND
One of the primary strengths of the United States Armed Forces is advanced
technology. This was never illustrated more clearly than when our forces dominated the
battlefield during the Gulf War. There are many varied technologies that contribute to the
effectiveness of our weapon systems; however, software can be viewed as a common
thread. Today, our fighter aircraft would not fly and our venerable Ml Tank and M2
Bradley Fighting Vehicle would not "hit the side of a barn" without software. As we
continue to modernize our force we are increasing our use of software to include systems
which were traditionally viewed as being too simple to need it. An example of this is the
Land Warrior Project where a fully-integrated combat system is being developed for the
fighting soldier. This software-intensive system will include a heads-up monocular
display which will incorporate navigation including graphical maps and global
positioning system, communications, individual weapon fire control, and night vision
capabilities.
As we increase use of software in the Department of Defense (DoD) we are also
increasing our expectations concerning what software can accomplish. We expect
software to increase the capabilities of our weapon systems, to make them more flexible,
and to allow us to upgrade their capabilities in the future. This increase in expectations
has caused the size and complexity of our software to increase dramatically. As size and
complexity increase, the challenges associated with software program management grow
exponentially. In fact, poor management is cited as the primary cause of failures in
software-intensive systems [Ref. 32, Ch. 1, p. 18]. While expectations increase and
program management becomes more difficult, software technology continues to evolve.
New software languages, which support tools and development methods, are constantly
changing, making previously valid software practices and experience obsolete. For
example, we are using 4th and 5 th generation languages that are very powerful compared
to earlier generation languages. One line of code in a 4 generation language can
generate hundreds of lines of code in machine or assembly language, and mixing early-
generation re-used code with modern languages and methods is difficult [Ref. 31].
The growing size, complexity, and managerial challenge associated with software,
along with DoD's increased expectations, have made software development efforts the
highest-risk element of modern program management. One way that we can mitigate this
risk and better manage software development efforts is through the use of metrics. In
fact, it would be very difficult, at best, to properly manage any development effort
without the use of some type of metric. Software metrics can give us insight about the
progress, quality, and expected completion of a software development effort.
In earlier software development efforts, programming was viewed as a "black art"
and, consequently, software metrics were not commonly used. Today, it is generally
accepted that a software development effort should be properly planned and that software
metrics should be used to control the project. Program managers are no longer concerned
about whether or not to use metrics but are more concerned with which metrics to use and
whether or not the ones chosen will be effective. This question can best be answered by
studying past uses of software metrics.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question:
What steps can a program manager take to ensure that the right software metrics
are chosen and that the chosen metrics are effective?
2. Secondary Research Questions:
a. What are software metrics and what are they used for?
b. What is the Army policy on software metrics?
c. What software metrics are used in the Bradley A3 software
development?
d. In what ways are the Bradley A3 software metrics effective in
measuring program progress?
e. What lessons can be learned from the use of software metrics in the
Bradley A3 program?
f. How can these lessons learned be generalized to guide and support
other program managers?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
This research uses the case of the Bradley A3 program to address issues
concerning software metrics from a program manager's perspective. The software
metrics used in the Bradley A3 program are analyzed based on their effectiveness in
providing usable insight into the software development effort of this software-intensive
weapon system.
E. METHODOLOGY
In order to provide a better understanding of the Bradley weapon system and the
issues involved with software metrics, this research paper first provides a general
overview of both the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Software Metrics. In order to
accomplish this I utilized the following resources:
• Department of Defense Publications
• Books, Periodicals, Journals, and electronic resources available at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) Library
• Internet web-sites pertaining to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle or software
development
• Interviews with systems management faculty at NPS
Then, I conduct an analysis of the software metrics applied in the case of the
Bradley A3 Program. In addition to the resources listed above I attained program
information from the Bradley A3 Program Office and United Defense Limited
Partnership (UDLP), the primary contractor. Also, Government and contractor personnel
with key roles in the Bradley A3 software development effort were interviewed. The end
result of this case analysis is a group of lessons learned in applying software metrics in a
software-intensive weapon system.
F. ORGANIZATION
In Chapter II, I provide an overview of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. This
includes a description of the vehicle and its role on the battlefield. Also, I describe the
variants of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and their differences with special emphasis on
the A3 model. I conclude the chapter with a chapter summary.
In Chapter HI, I provide an overview of software metrics. I begin by discussing
what software metrics are and how they have evolved. Then I give examples of software
metrics used. I then discuss the DoD policy on software metrics and conclude with a
chapter summary.
In Chapter IV, I discuss how software metrics were applied in the Bradley A3
program. This includes a discussion of which software metrics were used and an analysis
of how effective they were. Then I discuss the lessons that can be learned from this
application of software metrics and how they can be generalized so that they will be
useful to a program manager of any software-intensive program.
Chapter V is the last chapter of this thesis. I summarize the findings of this
research and the answers to my research questions. Then I conclude with
recommendations for further study.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This research is the first at NPS addressing software metrics. The results of this
research will provide valuable insight into the complexity of managing software-intensive
weapon systems. Specifically, the lessons learned from the use of software metrics in the
case of the Bradley A3 will make students at NPS and other future program/project
managers in DoD more aware of how to apply software metrics to maximize their
effectiveness.
II. THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the Bradley Fighting
Vehicle. I will first provide a vehicle description and discuss the role of the Bradley on
the battlefield. Then I will describe the Bradley variants and their differences with special
emphasis on the Bradley A3. I will conclude the chapter with a chapter summary.
B. DESCRIPTION
The Bradley Fighting Vehicle is a lightly-armored, fully-tracked vehicle that has a
three-man crew and can carry six additional soldiers. It has a turret which provides fire
control for the 25mm main gun, the TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-
guided) missile, and the 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun. The 25mm main gun is the
model 242 Bushmaster Chain Gun made by McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company. It
can fire in single-shot and multiple-shot modes and has dual-feed which allows the
gunner to select from two different types of ammunition (typically HE-High Explosive
and AP-Armor Piercing). The hull and turret of the Bradley are constructed of welded
ballistic aluminum and have additional steel armor plates in the later models. The
Bradley weighs approximately 67,000 pounds (combat loaded) and can travel 38 MPH on
roads and 4 MPH in water. [Ref. 3, 14, 36]
C. THE ROLE OF THE BRADLEY
The Bradley Fighting Vehicle System includes two vehicles, the M2 Infantry
Fighting Vehicle and the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle.
The role of the Bradley M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle is twofold. First of all, the
Bradley provides the infantryman with additional firepower to destroy or suppress enemy
tanks, vehicles, and troops. Secondly, the Bradley provides the infantryman with cross-
country mobility to critical locations on the battlefield while protecting him from artillery
and small arms threats. The Bradley M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle performs cavalry scout
missions and carries three crew members plus two scouts [Ref. 3].
D. THE BRADLEY VARIANTS (AO - A2 ODS)
There are four Bradley Variants in existence today. They are the AO, Al, A2 and
A2 ODS (Operation Desert Storm). In this section I will briefly describe each of the
variants and the new features that each one introduced.
1. Bradley AO
The First Bradley Fighting Vehicle AO was fielded in 1982 as a replacement for
the Ml 13 Armored Personnel Carrier. It represented a vast improvement in capability
since the M113's only armament was a .50 cal machine gun with no fire control and the
Ml 13 could not keep up with the Ml Tank in any terrain. This initial Bradley was armed
with the 25mm cannon and the basic TOW missile. A total of 2,300 AO Bradleys were
produced from 1982 to 1986 [Ref. 3]. Out of the 2,300 A0 Bradleys produced, 510 were
upgraded to A2 Bradleys. There are currently 1,744 A0 Bradleys in the Army inventory.
[Ref. 34]
2. Bradley Al
In 1986 the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Al was fielded. This new Bradley was
equipped to fire the more lethal TOW 2 missile and was equipped with the final drives
used on the Multiple-Launch-Rocket-System (MLRS) which are more reliable. Also,
vehicle and soldier survivability was improved with the addition of a revised fire
suppression system and a gas particulate filter unit for use in chemically contaminated
areas. Lastly, the equipment stowage in the vehicle was revised. A total of 1,371 Al
Bradleys were produced from 1986 to 1988 [Ref. 36]. All of these vehicles have been
upgraded to A2 and A2 ODS Bradleys [Ref. 34].
3. Bradley A2
Fig. 2-1, Bradley Fighting Vehicle M2A2 During Desert Storm [Ref. 3]
In 1988 the Bradley Fighting Vehicle A2 was fielded. The A2 Bradley
survivability was significantly better that that of previous Bradleys through the addition
of steel armor plates on the exterior of the hull and turret. These steel plates provided
armor protection against munitions 30mm and smaller. Additionally, spall liners were
added to the interior of the vehicle to reduce shrapnel in the event that a round penetrates
the vehicle. This vehicle was also configured so that reactive armor tiles could easily be
installed on the exterior of the hull and turret. To maintain the previous mobility
capabilities of the Bradley, despite the additional weight of the armor steel plates and
spall liners, a more powerful 600 horsepower engine and improved transmission were
also included in the A2 Bradley. Lastly, the ammunition storage inside the vehicle was
revised. Since 1988 3,107 new A2 Bradleys were produced and 1,356 Al Bradleys and
510 A0 Bradleys were upgraded for a total of total of 4,973 A2 Bradleys [Ref. 36]. Of
these 4,973 A2 Bradleys, 1,433 are being upgraded to A2 ODS Bradleys and 1,602 will
be upgraded to A3 Bradleys, leaving 1,886 A2 Bradleys in the future Army inventory
[Ref. 34].
4. Bradley A2 ODS
As with all major conflicts that the U.S. military is involved in, Operation Desert
Storm was a catalyst for the emergence of new weapon systems and the rapid infusion of
technology into existing systems. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle was one of the weapon
systems which benefited from wartime-induced improvements through the introduction of
the A2 ODS Bradley. The improvements on the A2 ODS Bradley are modular
installations to increase specific capabilites and are not electronically integrated into the
basic A2 Bradley configuration. Therefore, the improvements mentioned below can be
added to existing A2 Bradleys as needed. The A2 ODS Bradley, which has not yet been
fielded, includes a laser range finder that greatly improves the gunners' ability to get a
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first round hit on target. It also includes a Global Positioning System / Position
Navigation (GPS/POS NAV) system for navigation and a thermal viewer for the driver
which increases nighttime mobility and safety. Lastly, the A2 ODS Bradley incorporates
a combat identification system designed to decrease fratricide due to poor vehicle
identification and a counter-missile device which is designed to electronically jam an
incoming anti-tank missile. There will be 1,433 A2 Bradleys upgraded to the A2 ODS
Bradley configuration [Ref. 34 and 36].
E. THE BRADLEY A3
The Bradley A3 represents a leap in technology when compared to its
predecessors. It uses the same chassis and turret as the Bradley A2 and has the same
general appearance, however, the similarities end there. The foundation for most of the
improvements in the Bradley A3 is in the electronic design. The electronics in the older
Bradleys are analog and are not integrated while the electronics in the Bradley A3 are
digital and are fully-integrated through the use of two central processors and two 1553B
Data Buses [Ref. 34]. These two processors and data buses not only provide the key to
digital integration but also provide the system with redundancy which increases the
survivability and reliability of the system. This electronic "backbone" allows the use of
software to integrate new technologies and enhance the overall effectiveness of the
Bradley A3 [Ref. 11,22,39].
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Fig. 2-2, Bradley Fighting Vehicle M2A3 [Ref. 9]
The Bradley A3 has numerous new capabilities. I will describe each of the
Bradleys' major improvements by category (Command and Control, Lethality,
Survivability, Mobility, and Sustainability).
1. Command and Control
There are many new technologies in the Bradley A3 which significantly increase
the situational awareness of the vehicle commander and the dismount leader. The
commander will have a flat panel display that depicts maps, operational graphics, and
other tactical information. This tactical display will allow the commander to constantly
be aware of the tactical situation without having to be distracted by large, unwieldy paper
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maps. The Bradley A3 will also have a position/navigation (Pos/Nav) system with
inertial navigation and Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) capabilities. The
inertial navigation component of this Pos/Nav system provides constant location accuracy
when the PLGR is not tracking sufficient satellites. This system is fully integrated with
the commander's tactical display and the drivers' Pos/Nav display. In the Bradley A3, the
commander now has his own independent viewer with 2nd Generation Forward Looking
Infrared Radar (FLIR) and Day TV. This independent viewer allows the commander to
scan a different area than the gunner, resulting in increased situational awareness at the
full range of the optics. To increase the situational awareness of the dismounts, the
Bradley has a squad tactical display inside the vehicle. This squad tactical display allows
the dismounts to view the commanders' tactical display or whatever the gunner or
commander are viewing through their respective optics. This display will also decrease
the disorientation that the dismounts typically experience when exiting an enclosed
mechanized vehicle [Ref. 8, 38, 39].
2. Lethality
The lethality improvements to the Bradley A3 are all part of the Improved Bradley
Acquisition System (IBAS). Unlike the fire control on the previous Bradleys, the IBAS
system has an integrated Laser Rangefinder so the gunner does not have to estimate range
when shooting a target. The IBAS system also has Automatic Target Superelevation and
Lead that use range, tracking, and ammunition ballistic data to automatically adjust the
sight reticle for the ammunition being used and the range and motion of the target. These
features decrease engagement time and vastly increase the probability of a first shot
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hitting the target. The IBAS system also includes the Commanders' Independent Viewer
(CIV) which was mentioned in the previous section. The CIV not only increases
situational awareness but also increases the lethality of the weapon system. With the
addition of the CIV, the Bradley crew can track two targets, to include tracking a second
target while the first one is being engaged. Once the first target has been destroyed, the
turret can be adjusted to engage the second target (being tracked with the CIV) with the
flip of a switch. These Auto Dual Target Tracking and Auto Gun Target Adjustment
features can be used with the 25mm main gun or the TOW missiles for each engagement.
Lastly, the gunners' and commanders' viewers both use 2nd Generation FLIR that has
greater resolution and clarity than night vision viewers on previous Bradleys. This
improvement will improve the crews' ability to detect targets and correctly identify them,
resulting in increased lethality and decreased probability of fratricide [Ref. 8, 38, 39].
3. Survivability
The Bradley A3 has two major improvements with respect to survivability. The
first improvement is additional roof armor that improves protection against fragments
from artillery rounds bursting above the vehicle. The second improvement is the addition
of Gas Particulate Filter Unit (GPFU) and ventilation face pieces for the dismount
element, which were previously only available for the vehicle crew. The GPFU and
ventilation face pieces increase the soldiers' survivability when in an area contaminated
by chemical weapons or nuclear fallout [Ref. 8, 38, 39].
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4. Mobility
Like the A2 ODS variant of the Bradley, the A3 is equipped with the more
powerful 600 horsepower engine and improved transmission. The Bradley A3 mobility is
also improved through the addition of the all-weather drivers' viewer enhancer. This
improvement is most evident when driving the vehicle during hours of darkness or other
times of limited visibility (smoke, dust, or fog) [Ref. 8, 38, 39].
5. Sustainability
The sustainability of the Bradley A3 is improved through the integration of Built-
in-Test (BIT) diagnostics. Since the entire weapon system is integrated through the
1553B Data Buses it is possible to get feedback on how each subsystem is operating.
This diagnostic system conducts several diagnostic tests during regular startup and
operation of the system and also provides the option to manually initiate a specific test.
Previous Bradleys had separate test equipment that was bulky, difficult to use, and could
not consistently isolate an electronic fault. Also, using this separate test equipment
involved disconnecting and reconnecting several multi-pin cables that are delicate and
easily damaged. Because the BIT diagnostics on the Bradley A3 are embedded in the
vehicle, it will be easier to use and will decrease mechanic-induced faults [Ref. 8, 38, 39].
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Bradleys A0 through A2 ODS have provided us with capabilities which far
surpass those of the Ml 13 it replaced. These capabilities were validated by the
overwhelming success of Bradley units in Desert Storm. However, it is also evident that
the Bradley A3 will raise these capabilities to another level. The Bradley A3 has
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capitalized on the strengths of previous Bradleys through the addition of key technologies
that provide the system with enhanced capabilities. These enhanced capabilities, when
combined into a fully-integrated digital system, will make the Bradley A3 the most
capable mechanized vehicle ever produced. This increase in capabilities, however, has
caused a phenomenal increase in the complexity of producing the weapon system. Every
key technology added is dependent on software to operate as intended. Then, an even
greater amount of software is required to combine each of these technologies into a fully-
integrated system. The Bradley A3 is clearly a software-intensive system and, as a result,
the success of the software development effort is closely related to the success of the
overall system. This relationship between software and program success illustrates the




A. WHAT ARE METRICS?
Software metrics are the combination of a specific measurement and its
relationship to an established standard or index. Specifically:
A software measurement is a quantifiable dimension, attribute, or amount
of any aspect of a software program, product, or process. It is the raw data
which identify various elements of the software process and product.
Metrics are computed from measures. They are quantifiable indices used
to compare software products, processes, or projects or to predict their
outcomes. [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 3]
Without measurement and metrics it would be impossible to truly manage software
development. In other words "If you ain't measurin,' you ain't managin' — you're only
along for the ride (downhill)!" [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 2]. Measurement and metrics allow the
manager to assess the status of his program to determine if it is in trouble, in need of
corrective action, or process improvement [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 1].
B. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF METRICS
Galileo (1564-1642) once said, "What is not measurable make measurable" [Ref.
19, p. 6]. This statement seems especially relevant to the field of software metrics.
Through the use of software metrics, we have essentially measured what was once viewed
as something you could not measure. Although the belief that software could be
measured has only taken hold in the last decade, the field of software metrics is not a
recent development. As early as 1968, R. J. Rubey and R. D. Hartwick published a paper
on metrics titled "Quantitative Measurement of Program Quality" in Proceedings of the
ACM National Conference [Ref. 10, p. 16]. Despite this early attention to the idea of
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measuring program characteristics, programming was still viewed as a "black art". This
view of programming was widely accepted for many years but the drawbacks of this view
did not go unnoticed. Managers of software development efforts felt out of control since
"You can't manage what you can't measure!" [Ref. 15, p. 3]. Also, the Department of
Defense, which funded a large portion of early software development, was not
comfortable with this total lack of control. As the use of computers and software
increased, many began to question the view that programming was a "black art" and did
not agree with the assumption that it was impossible to control software development
efforts. Then, as the costs associated with software development began to increase [Ref.
5, p. 486], many began to ask: "Is it possible to identify or define indices of merit that can
support quantitative comparisons and evaluations of software and of the processes
associated with its design, development, use, maintenance, and evolution?" [Ref. 27,
Preface]. By the mid-70s more attention was being given to the ideas of software metrics.
It became evident to many that software measurement and metrics had the potential to
make software development "concepts more visible and therefore more understandable
and controllable" [Ref. 19, pp. 6-7]. Also, the number of articles and books written on
the subject of software metrics increased dramatically. People began to change their view
of software development as a "black art" and began to see that it had the potential to
become more of a science. At the same time, the field of software engineering was in its
early stages and gave birth to the idea that software could be designed in an organized and
methodical manner. These changes would cause the use of software metrics to increase
even more. However, by the early 80s, software metrics still were not widely-accepted
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and those attempting to use them found that they were not always effective. In 1981, a
Department of the Navy-funded research group concluded that there was "a great need for
quantitative software measures, both for management and technical reasons, and that
adequate measurement techniques did not exist" [Ref. 27, Preface]. One reason why the
software industry was slow to embrace the use software metrics was that implementing a
software metrics program required considerable effort and additional cost. Also,
implementing a software metrics program did not guarantee that the metrics would tell
the managers or customers what they were trying to find out about the project. There was
no guarantee of success since software developers were still trying to understand some of
the techniques of measuring software necessary for metrics to be effective. At the same
time, the field of software development was moving quickly and new languages were
continually being developed, making previously effective metrics less effective or
obsolete. Finally, by the late 80s and early 90s the use of software metrics was generally
accepted as a critical tool in the effective management of software projects. Capers
Jones, a well-respected authority in the field of software metrics, makes this point in
1991.
Measurement is the key to progress in software...Now that accurate
measurements and metrics are available, it can be asserted that software
engineering is ready to take its place beside the older engineering
disciplines as a true profession, rather than an art or craft as it has been for
so long. [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 3]
Today, despite the industry-wide acceptance of the use of metrics, implementing them
continues to be a significant challenge. Software projects continue to have problems and
in some cases fail. This is especially evident by the number of General Accounting
Office reports outlining the software problems experienced by defense related programs
19
in recent years. Norman E. Fenton and Shari L. Pfleeger identify some common
problems with software projects in their 1997 book Software Metrics: A Rigorous and
Practical Approach :
It is difficult to imagine electrical, mechanical, and civil engineering
without a central role for measurement. Indeed, science and engineering
can be neither effective nor practical without measurement. But
measurement has been considered a luxury in software engineering. For
most development projects:
-We fail to set measurable targets for our software products.
-We fail to understand and quantify the component costs of software
projects.
-We do not quantify or predict the quality of the products we produce.
-We allow anecdotal evidence to convince us to try yet another
revolutionary new development technology, without doing a carefully
controlled study to determine if the technology is efficient and effective
[Ref. 19, p. 10]
Many of the problems software projects face may be due to larger planning issues;
however, the proper use of metrics is almost always a common thread. Either metrics are
not used at all or they are improperly used. A fundamental problem is that, without the
proper use of metrics, a manager cannot predict cost or schedule or tell when ongoing
software development is in trouble.
C. TYPES OF METRICS
Because software is developed for a wide variety of applications and is written in
many different software languages, it is important to recognize that there are no "one size
fits all" metrics. Software development program managers should be given the flexibility
to determine which metrics are most useful for each specific project. Also, "quality, not
quantity, should be the guiding factor in selecting metrics" [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 27]. Since
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every software development effort has its distinct characteristics, the variety of different
metrics that could be used is seemingly infinite. In order to provide the background
necessary for a basic understanding of metrics, only a few metric types will be discussed.
I have chosen nine metric types that are fairly easy to understand and which address







7. Cost and Schedule
8. Scrap and Rework
9. Support
In the following sections I briefly explain each of these metric types and give examples
for each type.
1. Size
When discussing software, typically size metrics are the first type of metrics that
come to mind. This is largely because the Source Lines of Code (SLOC) size metric was
very popular when the use of metrics first began. The primary advantages of the SLOC
metric are that it is relatively easy to measure and it is useful for cost/schedule models.
The primary disadvantage of the SLOC metric is that it is difficult to estimate the total
number of SLOC using requirement statements. Estimates for SLOC prior to
development are typically done through analogy; comparing the current project with a
similar past project. The accuracy of the estimate will be directly related to the similarity
of the two projects. In DoD, where we keep systems for long periods of time, the two
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projects being compared may not be similar enough to result in an accurate estimate.
Also, the SLOC size metric can be difficult to use when mixing languages (in the current
development or when estimating through analogy) since different languages can require
varying SLOC to deliver the same functionality. Although SLOC is still being used,
many software projects have switched to the use of Function Points as a size metric.
Function Points are the weighted sums of five different factors that relate to user
requirements: External Inputs, External Outputs, External Inquiries, External Files
(interfaces to other systems), and Internal Files [Ref. 1, p. 639-640]. As the definition
implies, the function points of a software project can be estimated using the software
requirement statements. Another advantage of the function points metric is that it can be
easily applied to higher level languages. Also, once estimates for function points are
calculated, they can be used to estimate SLOC, which can then be used for cost/schedule
models as mentioned earlier. The main disadvantage of the function points metric is that
there are not extensive databases on the use of function points. Therefore, it is not
possible to estimate project size through analogy using the function points metric [Ref.
32, Ch. 8, p. 36]. A side-by-side comparison of SLOC and Function Points is illustrated
in Figure 3-1 on the following page.
2. Quality
Software metrics for quality can be defined in two ways: qualitatively and
quantitatively. Many define software quality in terms of user satisfaction. This definition
of quality can also be interpreted in many different ways. For example, you can measure
the software in terms of user satisfaction for different attributes such as performance,
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Fig. 3-1, Comparison of Function Points and SLOC [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 33]
supportability, or operating cost. One can also measure software quality in terms of
defects in the code. Again, this category can be broken down further into types of defects
with respect to specifications, reliability, or survivability. [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, pp. 28-30]
Figure 3-2 on the following page gives more examples of quantitative and qualitative
metrics for quality.
3. Complexity
The complexity metric is relevant to software development because it is closely
related to design errors and defects. Factors contributing to the complexity of software
projects are size, interfaces among modules, and structure. The metrics for software size
were already discussed. Common measures for interfaces among modules are "fan-in",
the number of modules invoking a given application, and "fan-out", the number of
modules invoked by a given application. Structure is simply the number of paths within a
module. Some metrics use a combination of attributes, such as size, interface, structure,
or other measures, to determine complexity while other metrics focus on only one
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Fig. 3-2, Example Metrics for Quality [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 30]
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Metric focuses specifically on the number of linearly independent paths (structure)
through a program [Ref. 19, p. 293, 357]. Complexity metrics are typically collected
through the use of automated tools: other programs designed to measure complexity
attributes [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, pp. 38-39].
4. Requirements
A requirements metric is the number of requirements for a specific software
project. The number of requirements is an important metric since many software projects
have had problems or failed due to undefined, unclear, changing, or increasing
requirements ("requirements creep"). If a requirements baseline is not established and
monitored, then requirements will evolve simultaneously as the software is being
developed, making previous efforts obsolete. Also, if requirements are not clarified early,
then many unexpected implicit requirements will be discovered late in the development
and cause problems. By tracking requirements metrics, the manager has visibility of both
the existing requirements (explicit and implicit) and any deviations from the requirements
baseline [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 40].
5. Effort
An effort metric is the amount of effort required for a specific software
development. An example measure used for effort is the total man-months required to
complete the project. Past software development programs have observed that there is
not a linear relationship between the effort and size of a project. In other words, you
cannot assume that a project twice the size of a similar project will require twice the man-
months to complete. Also, you cannot assume that by doubling the number of
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programmers assigned to a project you can complete the project in half the time. In most
cases, as the project size increases or the duration allowed decreases, there is an
exponential increase in effort required [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 41]. The phenomenon I just
described was best explained by Frederick P. Brooks in his popular book "The Mythical
Man-Month"; he attributed it to:
Sequential Tasks - Many tasks in software development, such as
debugging, must be completed in sequence. You cannot assign additional
people to future tasks.
Training - The training required increases when more programmers are
involved. Also, development progress actually slows down if
programmers are diverted to bring other programmers "up to speed" on the
current development.
Intercommunication - When more programmers are involved in a
development effort, more pairwise intercommunication is required. In
some cases, when too many programmers are assigned to a project (usually
to save time), the effort of communication quickly dominates the
individual effort on the development. [Ref. 7, pp. 44-52]
Typically, the effort required for a given project is estimated and then compared to
effort expended. Estimates for effort are usually calculated based on decomposition (sum
of the efforts for lower-level activities) or by using a model. Developers may also
estimate using analogy (comparison to a past project) or expert opinion, however, these
methods are not preferred. The effort, cost, and schedule metrics are closely related since
the accuracy of the effort metric will have a direct impact on cost and schedule. In
recognition of this relationship, some developers may group effort/cost as one metric.
[Ref. 19, p. 435]
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6. Productivity
Productivity metrics attempt to answer the question of how much actual software
you get for a specific amount of effort expended. The most common measure used is the
number of SLOC or Function Points per staff month [Ref. 19, p. 408]. The idea is that by
knowing the productivity of a project you are more able to maximize it and more
accurately estimate cost and schedule. Some of the common factors affecting
productivity are in Figure 3-3. Items with larger numbers have a greater impact on
productivity.
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Fig. 3-3, Software Productivity Factors [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 30]
7. Cost and Schedule
Cost and Schedule are probably the aspects of a software project that managers
and customers are most interested in since they are measures that have traditionally been
used for all types of projects. Also, cost and schedule help define the scope of a project
and allow managers to track two very important resources: money and time. Although
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size has the greatest impact on cost and schedule, there are other resources to consider,
such as:
Human resources - "The most significant resource of software
development" (Boehm 81). Skills and experience can vary widely from
person to person.
Hardware resources - Development platform, that is, the computers used
to write code. Also, compilers for specific software languages.
Software resources - Special software tools used to develop or test the
software code being developed.
Reusable resources - Existing software modules which will be integrated
into the current software development. [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 45-46]
The actual measures for cost and schedule of a project are determined based on estimates.
Because of the importance of these estimates, program managers typically use an
estimation methodology which they feel best suits their project. Here is a brief overview
of some commonly used estimation methods.
Analogies - Cost and Schedule are determined base on data from similar
past projects.
Expert Opinion - Cost and Schedule are determined based on input from
personnel with much experience on similar projects.
Parametric - Cost and Schedule are determined based on automated
parametric modeling tools which establish a relationship between "cost
drivers" (independent variables) and the cost and schedule of the project
(dependent variable).
Engineering Build - Cost and Schedule are determined based on the sum
of the estimated effort to complete each of the lower level tasks which
constitute the entire project.
Cost Performance Report Analysis - Cost and Schedule are determined
based on current progress within the project.
Cost Estimating Relationships - Cost and Schedule are determined based
on a relationship between and independent variable, such as size, and the
cost and schedule (dependent variable) of the project. Unlike Parametric
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estimates only one independent variable is used and the process is not
automated. [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, pp. 47-48]
8. Scrap and Rework
There has never been a programmer who could write "perfect" code. There will
always be errors and defects when developing software. Many of these errors and defects
will have to be fixed for the software to function properly. In most cases, fixing "bad"
code will constitute a large portion of the overall development effort. Some early data
suggest that code rework costs account for about 40% of all development expenditures.
Unfortunately, there are no existing models to estimate the amount of scrap and rework a
project will experience [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 49]. Therefore, the program manager should
reduce the risks associated with scrap and rework by:
• Using procedures to identify defects as early as possible;
• Examining the root causes of defects and introducing process
improvements to reduce or eliminate future defects; and
• Developing incentives that reward contractors/developers for early and
comprehensive defect detection and removal.
• Keeping track of the costs associated with scrap and rework to provide
incentive for the software developer to emphasize proper planning,
design, and other defect preventive measures. [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, pp. 48-
49]
In addition to taking measures to reduce the risk of scrap and rework it is helpful
to measure them as the development progresses. This will help minimize scrap and
rework by bringing more attention to them. Also, having these measures will allow the
developer to formulated parametric estimates (comparison based on project attributes) of
scrap and rework for future phases of development and for future projects. Once the
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developer has credible estimates, he will have useful scrap and rework metrics. [Ref. 32,
Ch. 8, pp. 48-49]
9. Support
It has been determined that Post Deployment Software Support (PDSS) is a major
contributor to the life-cycle cost of defense related software-intensive systems. This is
because these software-intensive systems are continually upgraded to either fix existing
problems or add new capabilities. By building a system with high software supportability
we can decrease the life-cycle cost of the system and ensure that we can easily take
advantage of the flexibility which software offers. Here are some of the metrics which
can help a manager focus on software supportability:
Memory size - This metric tracks spare memory over time. The spare
memory percentage should not go below the specification requirement.
Input/output - This metric tracks the amount of spare I/O capacity as a
function of time. The capacity should not go below the specification
requirement.
Throughput - This metric tracks the amount of throughput capacity as a
function of time. The capacity should not go below specification
requirements.
Average module size - This metric tracks the average module size as a
function of time. The module size should not exceed the specification
requirement.
Module complexity - This metric tracks the average complexity figure
over time. The average complexity should not exceed the specification
requirement.
Error rate - This metric tracks the number of errors compared to number of
errors corrected over time. The difference between the two is the number
of errors still open over time. This metric can be used as a value for tested
software reliability in the environment for which it was designed.
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Supportability - This metric tracks the average time required to correct a
deficiency over time. The measure should either remain constant or the
average time should decrease. A decreasing average time indicates
supportability improvement.
Lines-of-code changed - This metric tracks the average lines-of-code
changed per deficiency corrected when measured over time. The number
should remain constant to show the complexity is not increasing and that
ease of change is not being degraded. [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, pp. 50-51].
D. DOD POLICIES ON SOFTWARE METRICS - PAST AND PRESENT
The first DoD acquisition policies on the use of software metrics were in DoD
regulations 5000.3-M-l and 5000.3-M-3 dated 1986. These regulations specifically
outlined items that the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) should address with
respect to software development [Ref. 2]. One of these items was to collect software
metrics to evaluate software test results. Despite the existence of these policies, software
metrics were not commonly used. There was a general lack of focus on software
management issues within software-intensive programs which resulted in a long line of
problem-plagued programs. The Defense Science Board Task Force and the Army's
Software Test and Evaluation Panel (STEP) confirmed this lack of focus in 1987 and
1990 respectively [Ref. 2]. In conjunction with their findings, the STEP made a number
of recommendations to the Army on how to fix the software problem. One of these
recommendations was that the Army enforce a specific set of software metrics. In
response to the STEP recommendations, the Army created DA Pamphlet 73-1; "Army
Software Test and Evaluation Guidelines" dated 1992 [Ref. 2]. This pamphlet mandated
that all programs with software-intensive systems use 12 specific metrics.
1. COST - Tracks software expenditures ($ spent vs. $ allocated).
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2. SCHEDULE - Tracks progress vs. schedule (event/deliverable
progress).
3. COMPUTER RESOURCE UTILIZATION - Tracks planned vs. actual
size (% resource capacity utilized).
4. SOFTWARE ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENT - Rates developer's
environment (developer's resources and software development process
maturity).
5. REQUIREMENTS TRACEABILITY - Tracks requirements to code
(% requirements traced to design, code, and test).
6. REQUIREMENTS STABILITY - Tracks changes to requirements
(user/developer requirements changes and effects).
7. COMPLEXITY - Assesses code quality.
8. BREADTH OF TESTING - Tracks testing of requirements (%
functions/requirements demonstrated).
9. DEPTH OF TESTING - Tracks testing of code (degree of testing).
10. FAULT PROFILES - Tracks open vs. closed anomalies (total faults,




RELIABILITY - Monitors potential downtime (software's contribution
to mission failure).
12. DESIGN STABILITY - Tracks design changes and effects (changes to
design, % design completion).
These metrics came to be known as the Army "STEP metrics". Specific guidance in DA
Pamphlet 73-1 dictated that the 12 metrics would be defined by 242 specific data
elements that would be reported in a specific format [Ref. 2]. Because of the rigid nature
of these requirements, they were subject to much criticism within the acquisition
community, especially among program managers who thought the policy was
unnecessarily restrictive. With the onset of acquisition reform initiated by Secretary of
Defense Perry, the requirements set forth by DA Pamphlet 73-1 were relaxed somewhat
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in 1994. Program managers of software-intensive systems were still required to report the
12 "STEP metrics", however, they were given the flexibility to determine which data
elements would define the 12 metrics. Although this new policy was less restrictive than
the previous one, many acquisition reform advocates felt that program managers should
have more flexibility to decide what metrics were most relevant for their program [Ref.
2]. Then, in March 1996 a new set of acquisition reform initiatives was set forth by the
new DoD 5000 series. The DoD 5000.2 Regulation shifted the focus from a specific set
of metrics to six management issues.
1
.
Schedule and Progress - regarding completion of program milestones,
significant events, and individual work items.
2. Growth and Stability - regarding stability of required functionality or
capability and the volume of software delivered to provide required
capability.
3. Funding and Personnel Resources - regarding the balance between
work to be performed and resources assigned and used.
4. Product Quality - regarding the ability of delivered product to support
the user's need without failure, and problems and errors discovered
during testing that result in the need for rework.
5. Software Development Performance - regarding the developer's
productivity capabilities relative to program needs.
6. Technical Adequacy - regarding software reuse and use of approved
standard data elements, and compliance with the DoD Joint Technical
Architecture (JTA). [Ref. 17, App. V]
This change of focus was further solidified in September 1996 by a memo issued by the
Army Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and
Computers (DISC4) and in December 1996 by a new DA Pamphlet 73-7 which
superceded DA Pamphlet 73-1. Program Managers were now free to select those metrics
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which they felt were most appropriate for their weapon system. However, DA Pamphlet
73-7 suggests 14 "Army Metrics" (12 "STEP" metrics plus 2 new ones) which could
easily be used to fulfill the requirement to keep track of the six management issues. The
policy I have just described is the policy which remains in force today with the exception
that an additional management issue was added to the 5000.2 Regulation in March 1998:
Program Success - regarding achievement of performance measures that are linked to
strategic goals and objectives [Ref. 17, App. V].
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
As software development has evolved, software metrics have become the primary
tool available to control and manage software projects. However, the acceptance of
metrics was slow to take place since software developers and others were slow to change
their view of software development. Finally, after many years and many failed software
development efforts, software development has come to be viewed as a science and the
use of metrics has become widespread [Ref. 19, pp. 6-7, Ref. 24, p. 5]. Despite the
acceptance of software metrics, developers still face substantial challenges when using
them. They must decide what they want to know about their project, which metrics will
provide that information, and how to best implement the metrics chosen. Also, as with
any measure, there are shortcomings to the use of particular metrics, so software
developers are continually challenged to improve their measurements and metrics.
Since the Department of Defense funded many early software development
efforts, it played a major part in the development of software metrics. As with many DoD
policies, the policies on software metrics have seemed to follow cyclical patterns from
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little to strict control. Initially, software requirements existed only to support testing.
Then, a specific set of metrics, which consisted of specific data elements, was required.
Finally, program managers today can choose the metrics they feel are most appropriate as
long as the metrics provide insight to specific management issues.
Although software metrics are accepted among software developers and the
Department of Defense, software-intensive programs have continued to have problems
with their software development efforts. This would lead us to believe that we can still
benefit from the study of software metrics. As Norman E. Fenton stated "where we can
already measure, we should be making our measurements better" [Ref. 19, p. 6].
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IV. SOFTWARE METRICS AND THE BRADLEY A3 PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a discussion and analysis of how software metrics were
applied in the Bradley A3 program. First, a description of the past and present metrics
will be provided. Then, the focus will shift to program management-level issues relevant
to the application of software metrics. The three primary issues addressed in this chapter
are: 1) The Purpose of Metrics, 2) Implementing an Integrated Metrics Program, and 3)
Which Metrics to Use. These issues were derived based on interviews with key personnel
and program information attained from both the Bradley A3 Program Office and UDLP.
The Bradley A3 Program is discussed and analyzed with respect to each of these issues.
The chapter concludes with generalized lessons learned, which are relevant to any
software-intensive program.
B. BRADLEY A3 METRICS - PAST AND PRESENT
Before software development had begun on the Bradley A3, the program manager
recognized that the contractor had little experience developing real-time, embedded
software systems. To alleviate the risk to the program, he solicited the help of the U. S.
Army Missile Command (MICOM, now Aviation and Missile Command, AMCOM)
Software Engineering Directorate (SED, now Battlefield Automation Directorate, BAD).
The SED role would be to assist the contractor and program management office with all
issues involved in managing software development for the Bradley A3. This would
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include both advising the two organizations on all software-related issues and direct
involvement with respect to software metrics. [Ref. 13, 22]
When software development began on the Bradley A3, the twelve Army STEP
metrics were collected. As mentioned earlier, these twelve STEP metrics were mandated
by Army policy and were also included in the Statement of Work (SOW) for the Bradley
A3. The STEP metrics were collected by the Software Quality Assurance (SQA)
organization within UDLP and were briefed during quarterly program reviews. Neither
the contractor's software managers nor the government program manager understood or
used these metrics. Also, there was very little involvement by the software developers
within UDLP in collecting the metrics. Each time these metrics were briefed, the
audience struggled to gain some meaning from them. The reliability and fault profile
metrics consistently confused the audience. As a result, these metrics, although still
collected in accordance with the mandate and SOW, were no longer briefed. [Ref. 12, 13,
22]
Other metrics, however, proved to be more useful. Despite the Government's
primary focus on the STEP metrics, UDLP had been keeping data and estimates for
Source-Lines-Of-Code (SLOC). This data would prove the value of metrics as the
program approached the software development for the Low-Rate-Initial-Production
(LRTP). Using the data and estimates for SLOC, SQA was able to calculate a crude
metric for productivity. They used this metric to determine that the first major software
build (version 1 .0) would not be completed until twelve months after the scheduled LRIP
In-Progress Review (IPR) date. Based on this information and advice from SED, the
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program manager decided to focus the software development effort on only those items
that were critical for LRIP. The result was that the software was released (Renamed
version 1.0.1) in time to support LRIP requirements, not twelve months late. [Ref. 12, 13,
22]
As the program office began briefing software metrics to the office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (SARDA),
the focus shifted from the STEP metrics to a new set of metrics. These metrics were:
Problem/Change Request (PCR) Status (priority and age)
Test coverage (Breadth and Depth)
Productivity
Fault Profile [Ref. 12, 13,41]
These metrics were established by the program manager based on discussions with
SARDA executives and were typically presented on 3-D bar charts which showed a
considerable level of detail. The entire packet consisted of 35 slides. Although these
metrics provided a lot of detail, they yielded little information which was useful to the
program manager or the SARDA executives. Also, because of the level of detail in the
charts, many questions were raised during briefings. The result was that much time was
spent explaining what certain charts were attempting to depict about the program. After
using these metrics for a year, the program manager decided it was time to revise them.
He had become frustrated by their shortcomings and saw the need for metrics which
could better predict the software development status. [Ref. 12, 13, 22]
The intent for the new metrics was to answer two fundamental questions that all
program managers are interested in: 1) What is the status of my program? and 2) Are
there any trends indicating that trouble lies ahead? In conjunction with the contractor,
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SED and the program manager settled on three metrics which would best answer the
questions above. The three metrics, which are still being used today, are:
Software Development Progress
Test Progress
High Urgency Problem/Change Report (PCR) Closeout [Ref. 12, 13, 41]
The Software Development metric consists of the number of software tasks complete
versus the number of software tasks scheduled. A sample chart of this metric is depicted
in Figure 4-1 below:
A3 ao S/W Development Schedule Performance
-Harmed
-CWrpleted
Fig. 4-1, Software Development Progress [Ref. 41]
Although this schedule metrics is very simple, it has provided the program
manager with an accurate measure of progress [Ref. 12, 13, 22].
The Test Progress Metric consists of the number of testing tasks complete versus
the number of testing tasks scheduled. A sample chart of this metric is depicted in Figure
4-2 on the following page:
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Fig. 4-2, Test Progress [Ref. 41]
The Test Progress Metric is another schedule metric but with a different perspective. The
use of this metric reflects the program manager's recognition that there is more than one
important aspect of program status with respect to progress. The actual software
development (code writing) is the obvious indicator of program status, but unexpectedly
slow progress in testing could just as easily cause schedule slips in the program.
The High Urgency Problem/Change Report (PCR) Closeout metric consists of the
number of high urgency PCRs cancelled or closed versus the number of high urgency
PCRs to be fixed in the current software build projected (based on resource constraints).
High urgency PCRs are the most critical to fix since they are usually related to safety or
mission-essential capabilities. A sample chart of this metric is depicted in Figure 4-3 on
the following page.
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R3.0 UDLP SW PCRs
Jan1 1998 Jan 15 1998 Feb1 1998 Feb 15 1998
Date
KfeM 1998 Kfer261998 AprJ 1 1998
Fig. 4-3, High Urgency PCR Closeout [Ref. 41]
Note that the projected progress line on this metric is straight. In the future, historical
data will be used to project the monthly rate of progress [Ref. 12, 13, 22].
In addition to the high priority PCR metric, the program manager is also briefed
on the status of targeted PCRs. This chart depicts the current status of all PCRs that will
be fixed in the current build. The targeted PCRs consist of key high and medium-urgency
PCRs which must be fixed to meet project milestones for the entire Bradley A3 system
[Ref. 12, 13, 22]. A sample of this chart is depicted in Figure 4-4 on the following page.
The PCR metric and status charts depicted above are important to the program
manager for two reasons. First, they give the program manager insight into the quality of
the software being developed. Second, they give the program manager insight into the














Fig. 4-4, Status of Targeted PCRs [Ref. 41]
consideration that focusing effort on fixing PCRs will have an impact on the contractor's
ability to make progress on new software code.
The metrics I have described above have been very useful in enabling the program
manager to stay informed on the status and trends of the software development.
However, these are not the only metrics used in the software development effort for the
Bradley A3. There are several other metrics which the UDLP software manager uses to
ensure that every aspect of the software development effort is on track. [Ref. 12, 13, 22]
C. ANALYSIS OF KEY SOFTWARE METRICS ISSUES
1. The Purpose of the Metrics
The purpose of metrics in the Bradley A3 software development became an over-
arching issue that the contractor and the program manager struggled with. This struggle
began early in development when the STEP metrics were being used. These metrics did
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not help the software manager or the program manager manage the program and did not
have a meaningful purpose other than meeting the Army and SOW requirements.
The Army policy mandating the use of specific STEP metrics and component data
elements caused the contractor and the program manager in the Bradley A3 program to
focus on metrics as a requirement to be met. This is expected with any policy that tells an
organization how to do something instead of telling them what they really want them to
accomplish. This is analogous to our use of military specifications and standards where
we would tell the contractor exactly what to build and, after he built it, we would realize
that the product did not meet our needs. The Army policy makers' intent was to improve
software acquisition management. However, the STEP policy did not focus on improving
software management. Instead, it focused on collecting certain metrics and data
elements. The assumption was that these metrics would provide the right insight into
software programs and, as a result, improve software acquisition management. However,
as the Bradley A3 Program has experienced, this assumption did not always hold true.
The program and software managers never had to ask themselves what they wanted to
know about the program with respect to software. The Army had dictated what aspects of
the software development they would keep track of, so that is what they did. Finally,
after realizing that the STEP metrics were not telling him anything useful about the
program, the program manager changed the metrics. The new metrics were an
improvement over the STEP metrics, however, SARDA executives had much influence
on what they would consist of. Because of this, the focus was still somewhat on
collecting specific metrics versus using metrics which would tell the program manager
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what he needed to know about the program. Finally, after once again realizing that this
set of metrics was not very useful, the program manager decided to change the metrics
again. This time the program manager, with the help of SED, decided on the final set of
metrics which are used today. [Ref. 12, 13, 22]
In addition to the problems with the Army policy on metrics, the contractor's
limited experience with embedded software contributed to the lack of meaningful purpose
for metrics. Since UDLP had never undertaken a software development of this scale, they
had not used metrics enough to understand how important metrics would be to the
program success. Also, they did not have an understanding of the valuable insights that
metrics could provide so that the managers could effectively manage the software
development. The result was that UDLP initially did not focus on their metrics program.
It was viewed as a requirement to be met, not as an essential part of software
management. [Ref. 12, 13, 22]
As with the contractor, the program manager also had limited experience with
software development. It would be difficult for anyone with limited experience to
understand the complexity of the software development and the -importance of software
metrics. Also, a manager with limited exposure to programs that had used metrics
effectively would more easily lose confidence in metrics. This was especially relevant
during the early software development for the Bradley A3 because of the difficulties
discussed above. As with the contractor, the result of the program manager's limited
experience was that the purpose of the software metrics was not focused on managing the
program, but was seen as requirement to be met.
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2. Implementing an Integrated Metrics Program
The implementation of the metrics program in the Bradley A3 development could
best be described as a learning process. The contractor, having had little experience with
software metrics, was not quite sure how to implement a metrics program. More
importantly, they did not understand the utility of implementing an effective program.
The result was that the metrics were not very useful until later in the development effort.
Early in the software development for the Bradley A3, the metrics program was
not an integrated part of the software development. When UDLP began the software
development, they had their Software Quality Assurance (SQA) organization collect the
data for the STEP metrics. By doing this, they had essentially separated the development
effort from the metrics program. The software developers were responsible only for the
development, not for the metrics which were supposed to be tracking the development.
The separation between the software development and metrics is a clear indicator that the
metrics were not being used as a management tool by the contractor. As mentioned in the
previous section, the requirement for metrics was being met, but they were not assisting
the managers (Government and contractor) in managing the program. The effectiveness
of metrics is based on the extent that they provide useful information to the managers so
that they can better manage the development effort. Because of the separation between
software development and metrics during implementation, the early metrics used in the
Bradley A3 program were not effective [Ref. 12, 13, 22].
As the software development for the Bradley A3 progressed, the integration of the
metrics program improved and the metrics became more useful. One of the driving
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factors behind this improvement was the involvement of the MICOM SED. They played
a key role in improving the use of metrics. First of all, through their interaction with the
contractor, they were able to provide advice on the use of metrics and how to ensure that
they were being used effectively. Through their expertise in software, they had a better
vision of the insights metrics could provide the managers. The SED also provided a great
deal of assistance to the program management office. They conducted a software
manager's "short course" to educate the program management office on software-related
issues, including metrics. The SED also provided the program manager with valuable
advice on the use and implementation of software metrics. By patiently working with the
contractor and by assisting them during implementation, the SED was able to help the
metrics program become integrated with the software development.
3. Choosing Metrics and Ensuring Their Effectiveness
This section will focus on choosing the right metrics and methods for increasing
their effectiveness. First, an analysis of the metrics used on the Bradley A3 Program will
be provided. This will be followed by a discussion and analysis of how the Bradley A3
Program increased the effectiveness of their metrics by using two different sets of metrics
tailored for the software management and program management levels. Then a
discussion and analysis of the importance of metrics presentation will be provided. The
section will close with a brief discussion and analysis of cost as a factor for choosing
metrics.
As mentioned in previous sections, early in the Bradley A3 Program, the STEP
metrics were not providing the software manager and program manager with useful
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information for managing the program. Under the Army's STEP metric policy, choosing
which metrics to use was not much of a consideration. Later, when the Army mandate for
STEP metrics was removed and the PM had decided to change the metrics, choosing the
right metrics became a relevant issue. Not being forced to use a specific set of metrics
was a step in the right direction. While under the Army STEP metric policy, the
contractor and program manager had begun to realize that metrics are not "one size fits
all." The STEP metrics were not providing the program manager with right information
that he needed to effectively manage the program. One of the main drawbacks of the
STEP metrics was that they provided the program manager with too much detailed data
and not enough useful information. The next set of metrics were chosen based on input
from SARDA executives. These metrics were somewhat more useful to the program
manager since they focused on broader management issues more appropriate to the
program manager. However, like the STEP metrics, so much detail was provided that it
was easy to become distracted by difficult to understand metrics and lose sight of the
more important issues. One of the underlying problems with both the STEP metrics and
this second set of metrics, was that they were not created by the manager to support the
manager. They were created by those external to the program management office, in one
case the Army, and in the other case SARDA executives. Finally, unrestrained by
external influence, the program manager was able to independently decide what he
wanted to know about the program. This is the first step toward choosing the right
metrics for a particular project. Because of his broad perspective of the program, the
program manager decided that he wanted to know about the status of the program and any
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trends indicating future trouble. This was the first time that questions about the program
preceded the formulation of metrics to be used. Given the program manager's questions,




High Urgency Problem/Change Report (PCR) Closeout [Ref. 41]
Because these metrics were chosen specifically to answer the program manager's
concerns about the program, they ended up being very effective.
The three metrics above are distinctly different than the metrics used by the
software manager. This makes a great deal of sense since the software manager's
perspective is very different than that of the program manager. The software manager
will want to know detailed information about different aspects of the development while
the program manager is more concerned about overall trends. Also, the software manager
has a much deeper understanding of software development and metrics, so he is more
likely to understand detailed metrics than a program manager. The disadvantage of the
program manager using only a few, very broad, metrics is that he may lose visibility on
obscure information which may indicate a problem in development. There are several
things the program manager can do to overcome this shortcoming. First, he can establish
a relationship of trust and cooperation with the contractor so that the contractor's software
manager will "raise the red flag" when he becomes aware of a potential problem that is
not reflected in the program manager's metrics. Second, the program manager can get
educated on software development and metrics to the extent that he will be more aware of
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software issues and the areas of the development that are most likely to cause problems.
Last, the program manager can solicit the help of organizations external to the contractor
with expertise in software development and metrics. This will provide the program
manager with an independent set of experts to help him oversee the software
development effort at a more detailed level without being overwhelmed by data he doesn't
understand.
The presentation of the metrics chosen is also critical to their effectiveness. Even
if the metrics answer the questions posed by the manager, they will not be useful if the
manager cannot understand the way they are being presented. "The measurements must
be presented in a way that tells both the customer and developer how the project is doing"
[Ref. 19, p. 19]. Note the simplicity of the sample charts in Section B. These charts
clearly depict the trends for each of the metrics and can be understood with very little
explanation.
Another factor to consider when choosing software metrics is what you can
afford. Like all reporting requirements imposed on a contractor, the collection of
software metrics is not free. This is especially true in a cost type contract such as the one
in place with UDLP. The program management office was fully aware of this issue when
choosing metrics for the Bradley A3 program. They have decided to use only those
metrics which are necessary to effectively manage the program. This would be the wisest
decision for any program given the competition for limited resources in today's
acquisition environment.
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D. GENERALIZED LESSONS LEARNED
The following lessons learned were derived from the research conducted in this
case analysis of the Bradley A3 metrics. However, they have been generalized for
application to any software-intensive program.
1. Hire the Experts
The program manager of any software-intensive program should solicit the help of
an independent agency to assist in overseeing software development. For example, it is
seldom the case that the program manager has enough experience with software to fully
understand all the issues involved with software development. Also, in many cases, the
contractor is not very experienced in software development either. Having support from
an agency with extensive experience in software development will mitigate the risk
associated with having an inexperienced contractor. This is especially the case with
complex, real-time, embedded systems.
2. Focus Metrics on Managing the Program
Having metrics which focus on the purpose of managing the software
development effort is critical to metrics effectiveness. For example, metrics will not be
effective if they are collected simply to meet a requirement or to appease an agency
external to the development program. By ensuring that the purpose of the metrics is to
fulfill the need to manage the software development, you will be providing the foundation
for useful insight into the development.
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3. Implement Only the Most Useful Metrics
The program manager should only implement the most useful metrics which are
absolutely required to manage the program. For example, he must resist the temptation to
try to know every detail of the software development. This is especially true in today's
acquisition environment where there is great competition for limited resources. We
simply cannot afford the luxury of unlimited information with respect to software
development.
4. Make the Software Developer Responsible for Metrics
To ensure that metrics are effective, they must be fully-integrated with the
software development effort. One way that the program manager and contractor can
promote this integration is by ensuring that the software developer is also responsible for
metrics. By being responsible for metrics, the software developer will not view metric
collection and tracking as separate functions that do not matter. Ideally, the software
developer will embrace the use of metrics and the information they provide managers at
all levels.
5. Tailor Your Metrics (Management Level, Stage, and Presentation)
Metrics will be most effective if they are tailored to the specific application.
Tailoring can take on many forms. First, metrics can be tailored for the specific level of
management. For example, metrics that the program manager uses should be broad and
depict general trends, while those that the software manager uses should be more detailed.
Second, metrics should also be tailored for each stage of the development. For example,
early in the software development it would make sense to focus on a requirements metric,
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while later in the development it would make more sense to focus on a design stability
metric. Last, the metrics presentation should be tailored for the specific audience. This is
important since the effectiveness of a metric is based on the information it provides to the
managers. A metric that is presented poorly or not understood will not be effective.
6. Get Educated on Software Development and Metrics
When managing any software-intensive system it is vital that the program
managers have at least a general understanding of software-related issues. There are few
opportunities for formal training and there is rarely excess time in any duty position.
Therefore, getting educated on software development becomes a matter of personal
development. There are organizations, such as the Software Program Manager's Network
[Ref. 3 1 ] or the Army Software Metrics Program [Ref. 2] that can answer a wide variety
of questions and recommend specific books or journals. Knowing more about software
and metrics will help the program manager deal with the challenges associated with
managing a software-intensive program. Also, it is much better to have that knowledge
before becoming the program manager or before the software development begins.
Although it is possible to learn much about software while managing its development,
knowing more prior to the development will allow the program manager to take full
advantage of that knowledge.
7. Cooperative Relationships Foster Success
When developing any system, having cooperative relationships with the contractor
and other agencies involved greatly increases the probability of overcoming problems
during development. Having a contentious "you vs. me" relationship will only exacerbate
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the effect of problems during development. This has been observed in many defense-
related programs. When a cooperative relationship exists, the contractor is not afraid to
inform the program manager of a problem. Also, with a cooperative relationship, the
response to a problem is more likely to focus on solving the problem, versus the
contentious relationship, where the focus shifts on who's fault it is. This positive
response to problems in cooperative relationships allows all parties involved to combine
their respective resources and find appropriate solutions. Lastly, the effects of having
cooperative relationships are multiplied when developing complex, software-intensive
systems.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This research shows that, based on lessons learned from the Bradley A3 program,
the most significant software metrics issues for a program manager are: focusing metrics
on the purpose of managing the program, and choosing the best set of metrics to use.
Software metrics were first created in hopes that software development could be
controlled and managed. As software development has evolved, developers have gained
a better understanding of metrics and proven that metrics are valuable management tools.
Using metrics with a focus on anything other than managing the program would result in
a lack of clear direction for the metrics program. Without without a clear understanding
of why you are using metrics, it is unlikely that the metrics program will be successful.
Metrics cannot be used simply to fulfil a requirement and then expect that they will assist
the manager in managing the development. In short, if managers want metrics to provide
them with insight about software development, they must not lose sight of the original
purpose of metrics: management.
Once the purpose of metrics is focused on managing the program, the next step is
to choose which metrics to use. As with the purpose of a metrics program, choosing
which metrics to use should be motivated by the needs of the manager. Using certain
metrics because they are mandatory or because someone external to the program
recommends them, will decrease the likelihood that the metrics will provide useful
information. In most cases, using metrics because of external influence will cause the
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program to expend resources gathering data which does not apply to the present effort and
fail to gather data which could translate into useful information. Also, the metrics that
the program manager uses do not need to be the same as those that the software manager
uses. Because of their different levels of management, their information needs are
different; therefore, the metrics they use should be different. Ideally, the original source
of any metric should be in the form of a question. As the manager plans, he will have
questions based on information he has identified that he will need to effectively manage
the program. Then, specific metrics should be chosen to answer those questions.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are many factors which influence the success of software metrics. Since
program managers cannot influence every one of these factors, it would seem logical to
influence those which he can and minimize the negative impact of the others.
The first factor, which the program manager has direct control over, is getting
educated on software development and metrics. This would be the best way to prepare
for managing a software-intensive system since it will have a direct impact on the
program. As a key decision-maker, the program manager is in a position to influence the
success of the development, including the use of metrics. As mentioned earlier, poor
management has been cited as the primary cause of failures in software-intensive systems
[Ref. 32, Ch. 1, p. 18]. The best way that we can prevent poor management from being
the cause of failures in the future, is by getting educated today. A program manager who
is more knowledgeable on software issues and metrics will be more capable at managing
software-intensive systems. Since he will already have a good knowledge base about
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software and metrics, he will be able to focus more on managing the program. He will
have a better understanding of areas or phases of the development that may be more likely
to encounter problems and will be better equipped to ask the right questions about these
areas before undetected problems get out of control. Also, the informed program
manager, based on his knowledge of metrics, will better understand the insight that they
can give him in managing the program. With this understanding, he will see the need for
effective metrics and will be more capable of choosing the right ones.
The second factor that the program manager has some control over is minimizing
the impact of a contractor who is not experienced at developing software-intensive
systems. This research has shown that the best way a program manager can accomplish
this is by soliciting the help of an independent agency. This independent agency can
assist the program manager in overseeing the contractor and assist the contractor in
increasing his development capabilities. It is difficult for any organization to develop
new capabilities without any assistance, especially if they are trying to utilize this new
capability as it is being established. This is the case when we expect a contractor to attain
the capability to develop software-intensive systems while actually developing one. This
situation creates a great deal of risk for a program. By hiring an independent agency we
can effectively mitigate this risk.
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C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are software metrics and what are they used for?
Software metrics are the combination of a specific measurement and its
relationship to an established standard or index. Specifically:
A software measurement is a quantifiable dimension, attribute, or amount
of any aspect of a software program, product, or process. It is the raw data
which identify various elements of the software process and product.
Metrics are computed from measures. They are quantifiable indices used
to compare software products, processes, or projects or to predict their
outcomes. [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 3]
Software metrics are used by program and software managers to manage software
development. Measurement and metrics allow the manager to assess the status of his
program to determine if it is in trouble, in need of corrective action, or requires process
improvement [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 1]. See section IQ.A. for more detail.
2. What is the Army policy on software metrics?
The Army policy on software metrics was changed in March 1996 by DoD 5000.2
Regulation, which shifted the focus from a specific set of metrics to six management
issues. The regulation stated that program managers should implement metrics which
address theses six management issues:
1
.
Schedule and Progress - regarding completion of program milestones,
significant events, and individual work items.
2. Growth and Stability - regarding stability of required functionality or
capability and the volume of software delivered to provide required
capability.
3. Funding and Personnel Resources - regarding the balance between
work to be performed and resources assigned and used.
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4. Product Quality - regarding the ability of delivered product to support
the user's need without failure, and problems and errors discovered
during testing that result in the need for rework.
5. Software Development Performance - regarding the developer's
productivity capabilities relative to program needs.
6. Technical Adequacy - regarding software reuse and use of approved
standard data elements, and compliance with the DoD Joint Technical
Architecture (JTA). [Ref. 17, App. V]
The policy I have just described is the policy which remains in force today with the
exception that an additional management issue was added to the 5000.2 Regulation in
March 1998: Program Success - regarding achievement of performance measures that are
linked to strategic goals and objectives [Ref. 17, App. V]. See Section ELD. for a
detailed description of past Army policies on software metrics.
3. What software metrics are used in the Bradley A3 software development?




High Urgency Problem/Change Report (PCR) Closeout [Ref. 12, 13, 41]
For more charts and description of these metrics see Section IV.B.
4. In what ways are the Bradley A3 software metrics effective in measuring
program progress?
The Bradley A3 software metrics are effective because they provide the program
manager with the information he needs to manage the program. In this case, the program
manager decided that he needed to be informed about the overall software development
progress, the test progress, and high urgency PCR closeouts. These three metrics allow
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the program manager to assess the status of his program to determine if it is in trouble, in
need of corrective action, or process improvement [Ref. 32, Ch. 8, p. 1]. Also, they are
presented in an easily-understandable format. See Sections IV.B. and IV.C. for more
detail.
5. What lessons can be learned from the use of software metrics in the
Bradley A3 program?
The following lessons learned were derived from the research conducted in this
case analysis of the Bradley A3 metrics. However, they have been generalized for
application to any software-intensive program.
1. Hire the Experts - The program manager of any software-intensive program
should solicit the help of an independent agency to assist in overseeing
software development.
2. Focus Metrics on Managing the Program - Having metrics which focus on the
purpose of managing the software development effort is critical to metrics
effectiveness.
3. Implement Only the Most Useful Metrics - The program manager should only
implement the most useful metrics which are absolutely required to manage
the program.
4. Make the Software Developer Responsible for Metrics - To ensure that
metrics are effective, they must be fully-integrated with the software
development effort. One way that the program manager and contractor can
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promote this integration is by ensuring that the software developer is also
responsible for metrics.
5. Tailor Your Metrics (Management Level, Stage, and Presentation) - Metrics
will be most effective if they are tailored to the specific application, such as
management level, stage of development, and presentation.
6. Get Educated on Software Development and Metrics - When managing any
software-intensive system it is vital that the program managers have at least a
general understanding of software-related issues.
7. Cooperative Relationships Foster Success - When developing any system,
having cooperative relationships with the contractor and other agencies
involved greatly increases the probability of overcoming problems during
development.
See Sections IV.D. for more detail.
6. How can these lessons learned be generalized to guide and support other
program managers?
See answer to question 5 above or Section IV.D.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Software Metrics in Other Software-Intensive Systems
Research the use of software metrics in other software-intensive systems.
Determine how metrics were use and the extent of their effectiveness. Develop a set of
lessons learned based on an analysis of the specific case.
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2. Program Manager Knowledge of Software Metrics
Conduct a survey of the knowledge base of program managers who manage
software-intensive systems with respect to software related issues, including metrics.
Analyze the results of the survey and any correlation to the program managers' self-
assessed ability to manage their programs. Make recommendations for methods to
improve or sustain the existing knowledge base.
3. Software Agencies
Investigate the variety of agencies available to assist program managers of
software-intensive programs in managing their programs. Include an analysis of the
extent of services that each agency can provide and their role in past or existing programs.
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